The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of Medical Care by Jason R. Barro et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFECTS OF CARDIAC SPECIALTY HOSPITALS










We would like to thank Richard Bohmer for helpful comments and advice, Robert McNary for exceptional
research assistance, and the National Institute on Aging through NBER for generous support.  Barro and
Huckman also acknowledge support from the Division of Research and Faculty Development at Harvard
Business School.  The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of any of the authors'
institutions.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Jason R. Barro, Robert S. Huckman, and Daniel P. Kessler.  All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of Medical Care
Jason R. Barro, Robert S. Huckman, and Daniel P. Kessler




The recent rise of specialty hospitals – typically for-profit firms that are at least partially owned by
physicians – has led to substantial debate about their effects on the cost and quality of care.
Advocates of specialty hospitals claim they improve quality and lower cost; critics contend they
concentrate on providing profitable procedures and attracting relatively healthy patients, leaving
(predominantly nonprofit) general hospitals with a less-remunerative, sicker patient population. We
find support for both sides of this debate. Markets experiencing entry by a cardiac specialty hospital
have lower spending for cardiac care without significantly worse clinical outcomes. In markets with
a specialty hospital, however, specialty hospitals tend to attract healthier patients and provide higher

















The debate over the welfare implications of specialty hospitals – for-profit, 
physician-owned institutions that serve patients with a particular illness, such as cardiac 
disease – involves several issues of long-standing interest to economists.  Opponents of 
specialty hospitals argue that they are a vehicle to disguise kickbacks to physicians for 
referrals, and that they thereby contribute to the "medical arms race" of competition 
through the provision of medically unnecessary services.
1  Opponents also argue that 
specialty hospitals “cherry pick” profitable services and healthy patients from general 
hospitals.  Specialty hospitals, for example, are less likely than general hospitals to have 
emergency departments (US GAO, 2003b).  In contrast, proponents argue that specialty 
hospitals are "focused factories" that not only offer their own patients more efficient 
specialized care but also lead neighboring general hospitals to become more responsive 
and up-to-date in their practices.   
These opposing views have been manifest in two distinct policy perspectives.  If 
competition from specialty hospitals has social benefits, then state regulators and public 
insurers such as Medicare and Medicaid should allow, and perhaps even facilitate, their 
entry.  If competition from specialty hospitals has social costs, however, then policy 
makers should set regulations and financial incentives to account for the negative external 
effects that specialty hospitals create.  As a result of this debate, the federal government 
imposed an 18-month moratorium in December 2003 on Medicare reimbursement for 
care at new specialty hospitals to allow for greater analysis of their impact.      
                                                 
1 The concept of competition among health care providers leading to higher levels service provision is 
noted by Joskow (1980), Held and Pauly (1983), and Robinson and Luft (1985).   3
Despite both practical and academic interest in this question, we are not aware of 
any existing research that has simultaneously estimated the effects of specialty hospital 
entry on health care costs and patient health outcomes; without information on both costs 
and outcomes, conclusions about welfare are necessarily speculative.  In this paper, we 
assess empirically the two main hypotheses about specialty hospitals.  We focus on the 
treatment of elderly Medicare beneficiaries with cardiac disease at single-specialty 
cardiac hospitals.  Most of these hospitals are jointly owned by for-profit chains and the 
local cardiologists and cardiac surgeons who practice at the facilities.   
First, we estimate how the Medicare expenditures, treatments, and outcomes for 
patients in geographic areas that experienced specialty hospital entry between 1996 and 
1999 changed over this period.  If specialty hospital entry leads to lower expenditures and 
better outcomes, we would conclude that it increases welfare.  If it leads to higher 
expenditures and worse outcomes, we would conclude that it decreases welfare.  If it 
leads to lower expenditures and worse outcomes (or higher expenditures and better 
outcomes), we would calculate the implied cost per life saved of specialty hospital entry 
to determine its welfare effects. 
Our approach provides an unbiased assessment of the effects of specialty 
hospitals even if specialty hospitals select healthier patients for treatment, because it 
estimates the effect of specialty hospital entry by the difference in all patients' 
expenditures and outcomes – not just those for patients at specialty hospitals – between 
entry and control geographic areas.  It identifies the direct plus any spillover effects of 
specialty hospitals.  The consistency of these estimates depends on the assumption that 
trends in the unobservable characteristics of patients and markets in entry versus control   4
areas are uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of costs and outcomes.  We 
investigate the validity of this assumption in detail below. 
Second, we examine how the expenditures, treatments, and outcomes of patients 
admitted to a specialty hospital differ from those admitted to a general hospital in a 1999 
cross-section of geographic areas with an operating specialty hospital.  In addition, we 
estimate the extent to which differences in observable patient characteristics explain 
differences in the care of patients admitted to a specialty versus a general hospital.  
Although these estimates can neither prove nor disprove the existence of socially harmful 
behavior, they show whether the elderly patient populations at cardiac specialty hospitals 
are healthier in observable terms and quantify the importance of these differences for 
observed variation in costs and outcomes.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the 
specialty hospital industry and discusses its potential implications for social welfare.  
Section III presents our empirical models.  Section IV describes our data sources and 
methods, Section V presents our results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
 II. SPECIALTY HOSPITALS:  BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS 
Specialty hospitals are not an entirely new phenomenon; hospitals focusing on 
treating children and psychiatric patients have existed for decades.  However, as a 2003 
US GAO report observes, new hospitals of this form differ from their earlier counterparts 
in several important ways.  The new genre of specialty hospitals includes four types:  
cardiac, orthopedic, general surgical, and women's.  Orthopedic specialty hospitals are 
approximately twice as common as each of the three other types, but cardiac specialty   5
hospitals have much greater aggregate revenues (US GAO, 2003b, Table 2) than any of 
the other types.
2  Most notably, these specialty hospitals are largely for-profit (93 percent 
of the specialty hospitals opened between 1990 and 2003 were for-profit (US GAO, 
2003b, Table 1)) and owned at least in part by their admitting physicians.  In fact, the 
median percentage of admitting physicians at specialty hospitals with ownership in that 
hospital was 73 percent in 2003 (US GAO, 2003b, Figure 1).
3 
In addition, these specialty hospitals are concentrated geographically in areas 
where state policy or local demographic conditions were favorable to hospital growth.  
Although 28 states in 2003 had at least one specialty hospital, approximately two-thirds 
of all specialty hospitals were located in seven states clustered in the western and 
southern portions of the country—Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and Texas (US GAO, 2003b, p. 3).  Of these states, Oklahoma was the 
only one that had a certificate of need (CON) program at any point after 1988, and that 
program did not cover cardiac services (Ho, 2005). 
The debate over specialty hospitals centers around two hypotheses that have 
implications for social welfare.  Arguments in favor of specialty hospitals focus on the 
potential for increased efficiency through either direct or spillover effects.  Direct effects 
exist to the extent that specialty hospitals treat patients more efficiently than incumbent 
                                                 
2 A 2005 report from the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) noted several differences 
between cardiac hospitals and orthopedic/surgery hospitals.  Relative to orthopedic/surgery hospitals, 
cardiac hospitals were characterized by a larger average daily census (40.4 vs. 4.5), a higher percentage of 
facilities with an emergency department (71% vs. 4%), a larger percentage of patient days attributable to 
Medicare (67% vs. 36%), and a smaller share of physician ownership (49% vs. 80%) (Center for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, 2005). 
3 Federal law, known as the Stark law, generally prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to 
facilities in which they have a financial interest.  The law exempts physicians who have an ownership stake 
in an entire hospital from a ban on referrals to that hospital, under the assumption that the largest stake that 
a physician could have in this context would be too small to create significant moral hazard.   6
general hospitals. In this vein, Herzlinger (1997) describes the benefits of specialty 
hospitals by viewing them as analogous to Skinner’s (1974) “focused factory."   
The direct benefits of specialty hospitals could stem from three factors.  First, 
given the substantial fixed investments required to provide services such as cardiac 
surgery or orthopedic procedures, specialty hospitals may be better able to exploit 
economies of scale by consolidating volume that would have otherwise been allocated 
across multiple diversified facilities.  Nevertheless, despite compelling theoretical 
arguments, empirical evidence of economies of scale in hospitals has been limited.  
Dranove and Shanley (1995) find that hospital systems do not appear to have lower costs 
than otherwise similar “pseudo systems”—random collections of independent hospitals.  
Dranove (1998) finds evidence of scale economies in “non-revenue producing cost 
centers” (e.g., administrative services such as public relations, accounting, medical 
records, and data processing) for relatively small hospitals, but notes that these 
economies are exhausted in hospitals with more than 10,000 annual discharges (or 
roughly 280 beds).
4 
Second, the aggregation of volume by specialty hospitals may enable them to 
benefit from returns to experience that could either reduce cost or improve the quality of 
care.  According to the GAO, although general hospitals typically have more beds than 
specialty hospitals, the focused mission of specialty hospitals often results in their 
treating more patients in their given fields of specialization (US GAO, 2003b, p. 5).  The 
substantial literature on the positive association between volume and outcome (Luft, 
Bunker, and Enthoven, 1979; Luft, Hunt, and Maerki, 1987; Hannan et al., 1991, 1997; 
                                                 
4 Dranove (1998) study does not test for economies of scale in clinical revenue centers on the assumption 
that the non-revenue centers represent the most likely source of scale economies.   7
Huckman and Pisano, 2005) with respect to many surgical procedures suggests that such 
benefits may be obtained by single-specialty facilities that are successful in aggregating 
volume within a market.   
Third, by allowing physicians to share in the efficiency gains through ownership, 
specialty hospitals may create more powerful incentives to achieve these and other cost 
and quality improvements. A report prepared by the Lewin Group on behalf of MedCath 
Corporation—a chain of specialty hospitals focused on cardiac care—finds support for 
these hypotheses, showing that patients at MedCath facilities had lower rates of risk-
adjusted patient mortality and shorter lengths of patient stay than a peer group of 1,192 
hospitals performing cardiac surgery in the United States (Dobson, 2003).   
Beyond these direct effects, the presence of specialty hospitals in a market may 
force competing general hospitals in the same market to become more efficient by 
threatening them with either declining prices or reduced share.  Although no previous 
work has investigated the spillover benefits of specialty hospitals, Kessler and 
McClellan's (2002) finding that the presence of for-profit competitors leads to increased 
efficiency at nonprofits suggests that such spillovers may be important. 
Critics of specialty hospitals, in contrast, argue that the same features of specialty 
hospitals that have the potential to make them more efficient also make them more likely 
to engage in behavior that reduces social welfare.  For example, critics argue that 
specialty hospitals may be better able than general hospitals to focus on providing the 
types of treatments that are the most profitable, even if this is not in society's interest 
overall, because specialty hospitals do not care for patients with all types of illnesses.  
The fact that specialty hospitals allow admitting physicians to share in the institutions'   8
profits can strengthen physicians' incentives to help pursue this objective, just as it can 
strengthen physicians' incentives to reduce costs and improve quality.   
According to this reasoning, cardiac specialty hospitals' focus on technologically-
intensive services such as catheterization, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery is an 
example of such inefficient behavior.  Although these services are highly profitable 
(Horwitz, 2005), the fact that the marginal health benefits of expansions in their supply 
are generally modest (McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse, 1994) suggests that the 
welfare consequences of intensive treatments supplied by specialty hospitals may be 
questionable. 
Along these lines, critics also argue that specialty hospitals may be better able to 
attract the most profitable types of patients.  If patients with more severe forms of an 
illness are more costly to treat--and reimbursement systems such as Medicare's 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) do not fully compensate hospitals for this higher cost-
-then seeking out healthier patients can be a profitable business strategy.  By law, no 
hospital can turn away an acutely ill patient; but, according to critics, because specialty 
hospitals have greater discretion over the types of services they provide, they can shape 
their patient populations indirectly by promoting services that healthier patients value 
more highly.  The effect of patient selection within a given illness on hospital profits can 
be quite substantial.  In fact, federal policymakers specifically excluded psychiatric 
hospitals from the Medicare PPS system on the grounds that psychiatric Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs) were not able to capture adequately the severity and cost 
differences among patients (Cromwell et al., 1991).      9
Although shifting healthy patients from general to specialty hospitals does not, by 
itself, change total Medicare expenditures or any patient's actual care, it may have 
important implications for welfare in practice.  If Medicare reimbursement for sick 
patients is less than their average cost, and Medicare must reimburse hospitals enough to 
enable all or virtually all of them to break even (e.g., Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000), 
then shifting only healthy patients from general to specialty hospitals can lead to 
increases in Medicare expenditures in aggregate.  At the very least, such a transfer of 
resources to specialty hospitals from Medicare must be funded by taxation that imposes a 
deadweight loss.  If such transfers give general hospitals the incentive to mimic specialty 
hospitals in order to compete, then they may distort medical care decisions as well.   
  Empirical evidence on the consequences of specialty hospitals shows that there is 
a basis for critics' concerns.  Based on discharge data from the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project from six states, GAO found that specialty hospitals treated a smaller 
percentage of severely ill patients relative to general hospitals in their geographic areas 
(US GAO, 2003a, figure 9).  Cram et al. (2005) find that such differences in patient 
health status explain at least part of the difference in mortality rates at specialty and 
general hospitals.  Consistent with the GAO’s results, Winter (2003) finds that centers 
specializing in outpatient surgery serve less-severe patients, on average, than the 
outpatient departments of full-service hospitals.   Finally, Lynk and Longley (2002) 
present evidence suggesting that full-service hospitals suffer a decline in admissions of 
potentially profitable patients when ambulatory surgery centers, a close relative of 
specialty hospitals, enter the market.     10
  Yet despite the plausibility of both sides in the specialty-hospital debate, little 
work has investigated how specialty hospitals affect the cost of care.  In addition, 
previous work has neither investigated the importance of spillover effects nor 
satisfactorily controlled for selection bias in assessing the effect of specialty hospitals on 
quality.  By examining the consequences for Medicare expenditures and outcomes in 
markets where specialty hospitals have entered versus where they have not -- in addition 
to examining the consequences for patients at specialty versus general medical hospitals 
in markets with specialty hospitals -- this paper seeks to address both of these limitations.   
 
III. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
  We estimate the effects of cardiac specialty hospitals on the expenditures on and 
quality of care for elderly Medicare beneficiaries with cardiovascular illness.  
Specifically, we examine the impact of specialty hospitals on hospital expenditures, rates 
of use of specific intensive procedures, and health outcomes using longitudinal data on 
cohorts of elderly Medicare recipients who were hospitalized with incident illness in 
1993, 1996, and 1999.  We use models of two forms. 
The first set of models investigates how time trends in expenditures and outcomes 
in hospital referral regions (HRRs)
5 in which a specialty hospital opened in 1997 or 1998 
                                                 
5 The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care defines hospital markets at two levels.  The finest level is referred to 
as the hospital service area (HSA).  Most the 3,436 HSAs in the United States contain only one acute-care 
hospital; the distribution of total 1996 population across HSAs ranged from 604 to 3,067,356.  Each of the 
306 hospital referral regions (HRRs) represents a broader grouping of several HSAs; the distribution of 
total 1996 population across HRRs from 126,329 to 9,288,694.  The Dartmouth Atlas describes the 
definition of these broader market areas as follows:  “Hospital referral regions (HRRs) represent regional 
health care markets for tertiary medical care. Each HRR contained at least one hospital that performed 
major cardiovascular procedures and neurosurgery. In a similar fashion, HRRs were defined by assigning 
HSAs to the region where the greatest proportion of major cardiovascular procedures were performed, with   11
(“entry” HRRs) differ from trends in HRRs in which no specialty hospital opened 
(“control” HRRs).  The objective of these models is to identify the net direct plus 
spillover effects of specialty hospital entry on the care of patients in a hospital market.  In 
1997 or 1998, five cardiac specialty hospitals opened in the United States.  These five 
hospitals were located in five different HRRs and were owned by three different entities.   
The second set of models investigates how 1999 levels of expenditures and 
outcomes within an HRR differ between patients initially admitted to a specialty versus a 
general hospital.  We estimate these models on HRRs that had an open specialty hospital 
as of January 1, 1999.  The objective of these models is to identify the extent to which 
specialty hospitals treat patients more intensively and the effect of differences in patient 
mix between specialty and general hospitals on expenditures, treatments, and outcomes.  
In 1999, there were eight open specialty hospitals.  These eight hospitals were located in 
seven different HRRs and were owned by six different entities.   
 In  HRR  k during year t =1993, 1996, 1999, the observational units in our analysis 
are individuals i = 1, …, Nkt who are initially admitted to hospital j with a new 
occurrence of illness.  Each patient has a vector of characteristics Xit: five age indicator 
variables (65-69 years, 70-74 years, 75-79 years, and 80-84 years; 85-89 years; omitted 
group 90-99 years), gender, race (black or non-black), and the patient’s hospital 
expenditures in the 180 days prior to the onset of the study illness.  This final variable 
captures the overall status of the patient’s health upon admission to the hospital.  We also 
include diagnosis-code indicator variables for each of the following conditions: acute 
                                                                                                                                                 
minor modifications to achieve geographic contiguity, a minimum population size of 120,000, and a high 
localization index.” (Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, 2004). 
    12
myocardial infarction [AMI] (ICD9=410), ischemic heart disease [IHD] (ICD9=414), 
dysrhthmyia (ICD9=427), heart failure (ICD9=428), other heart conditions (ICD9 in 390-
429, except 410, 414, 427, and 428), or circulatory system disorders (ICD9=439-448).  
The omitted group among these indicators is that for cerebrovascular disorders 
(ICD9=430-438).  Finally, each patient has a vector of indicator variables Zjt 
characterizing her hospital of initial admission (e.g., for-profit, nonprofit, or public 
ownership; system membership status; teaching status; and size).   
We analyze three dependent variables.  The individual incurs total Medicare 
inpatient hospital expenditures of Yit, where Y is total expenditures in the year after and 
including the admission to the hospital for the study illness.  The binary variable Cit is 
equal to one if the individual receives one or more specific intensive procedures within a 
given interval (e.g., one day or one year) after the initial admission to the hospital and 
zero otherwise.   The patient has health outcome Oit, where O equals one if the patient has 
an adverse health outcome within 365 days of the initial hospital admission and zero 
otherwise. 
The first set of models is of the following form: 
     Cit 
     Yit = γk + α(y99t) + β (entry_y99kt) + Xitφ + Zjtδ + εit           (1) 
     Oit  
 
     Cit 
     Yit = γk + α1(y99t) + α2(trendt) + α3(entry_trendkt) + 
     Oit          β(entry_99kt) + Xitφ + Zjtδ + εit               (1a) 
 
where y99t equals one if the year is 1999 and zero otherwise; and γk is an HRR fixed-
effect.  The interaction entry_99kt, equals one if HRR k is one of the five HRRs that 
experienced entry by a specialty hospital and the year is 1999 and is otherwise equal to 
zero.  The variable trendt equals zero if the year is 1993 and assumes a value of one or   13
two if the year is 1996 or 1999, respectively.  The interaction term, entry_trendkt, equals 
one if HRR k experienced specialty hospital entry and the year is 1996; two if HRR k 
experienced specialty hospital entry and the year is1999; and zero otherwise.  Finally, εikt 
is an error term, where E(εikt|…) = 0.  Equation (1) is estimated using data for 1996 and 
1999 and is again estimated using data for 1993 and 1999 to examine the impact of the 
selected base year on our results.   Equation (1a) is estimated using data for 1993, 1996, 
and 1999.   
  The coefficient of interest in these models is β.  In (1), β represents the difference 
in 1996-99 growth in outcomes between those HRRs that did and did not experience 
specialty hospital entry.  In (1a), β represents the difference in 1996-99 growth in 
outcomes in HRRs that did and did not experience specialty hospital entry, over and 
above the constant growth trend for the 1993-99 period.  Put another way, model (1a) 
controls for preexisting differences in growth rates for entry HRRs in estimating the 
effect of specialty hospital entry. 
The second set of models is of the following form: 
     Cit 
        Yit = α + γk + β(specialty_hospjt) + Xitφ + Zjtδ  + εit                    (2) 
     Oit  
 
where specialty_hospjt equals one if hospital j was one of the eight specialty hospitals 
open in 1999 and zero otherwise.  In (2), β represents the difference in 1999 levels of 
outcomes for patients initially admitted to a specialty versus a general hospital. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODS 
  We analyze patients with a new occurrence of cardiovascular illness in 1993, 
1996, and 1999.
6  We identified cardiac specialty hospitals (and HRRs that experienced 
specialty hospital entry) through a search of the trade press.  We included both free-
standing cardiac hospitals and cardiac hospitals-within-a-hospital.
7  This broad inclusion 
rule should, if anything, bias our results against finding a difference between specialty 
and general hospitals. As described above, our search yielded five specialty hospitals that 
opened in 1997 or 1998, and eight specialty hospitals that were open as of January 1999.  
We define a patient as having had a new occurrence of illness in a given year if that 
patient was admitted in 1993, 1996, or 1999 with a diagnosis of cardiovascular illness 
without having been admitted with cardiovascular illness in the previous six months.  
Additionally, we exclude patients admitted to the hospital between January and June 
1996 (because six months of claims data required to ensure the absence of prior 
admissions were not available for these individuals), patients who were in HMOs 
(because claims data is not available for Medicare HMO patients during our study 
period), patients suffering from end-stage renal disease, and non-elderly patients. 
We use data from three principal sources in our analysis.  First, we use the 20 
percent Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) file (for 1993) and the 100 
percent MEDPAR file (for 1996 and 1999) to construct total Medicare payments 
(including patients’ deductibles and copayments) in the year after initial admission for a 
new occurrence of illness.  Expenditures include all inpatient plus outpatient hospital 
                                                 
6 We define cardiovascular illness as ICD9 codes 390-448, except 456, 459 and V43. 
7 Hospitals-within-a-hospital are specialty hospitals that are physically located on the campus of a general 
hospital but are separately licensed and certified.  They generally have independent facilities such as 
operating rooms, physical therapy suites, and pharmacies.   15
reimbursements (including copayments and deductibles not paid by Medicare) from 
insurance claims for all hospitalizations in the year following each patient’s initial 
admission.
8   
The diagnostic procedure used to assess artery status is cardiac catheterization or 
angiography (CATH), which may be followed by either coronary artery bypass graft 
surgery (CABG) or percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) to 
“revascularize,” or remove blockages, detected by CATH.  We construct indicator 
variables denoting whether each patient received each of these three intensive procedures 
in the day and the year after the onset of illness.  We also tabulate each patient’s 
expenditures on acute hospital care in the 180 days prior to admission for his study 
illness, as a measure of individual health status on entry to the study cohort.  We measure 
the occurrence of complications with a variable indicating whether the patient was 
readmitted within one year with a subsequent episode of AMI or heart failure.
9  Data on 
patient demographics were obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration’s 
HISKEW enrollment files, with death dates based on death reports validated by the 
Social Security Administration.  We used these death dates to create an indicator variable 
for one-year mortality.  
  Our second principal data source is comprehensive information on U.S. hospital 
characteristics provided by the annual American Hospital Association (AHA) Survey.  
We restrict our sample to nonfederal, nonrural hospitals that ever reported providing 
                                                 
8 Because Medicare’s diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system for hospitals in theory compensates 
hospitals on a fixed-price basis per admission for treatment, hospital expenditures might appear to be a poor 
measure of the resources devoted to a course of care.  However, this proposition is not true in practice.  The 
intensity of treatment of most health problems varies enormously, and the DRG system contains important 
elements of cost sharing (e.g., McClellan, 1997).     
9 We exclude readmissions within 30 days, which may represent a continuation of the initial course of 
treatment.   16
general or surgical services.   From the survey we obtain information on hospital 
ownership type, size, teaching status, system membership, and other characteristics that 
might affect the incentives of the hospital and its managers.  We classify hospitals into 
three ownership categories (nonprofit, for-profit, and public (the omitted group)) and two 
size categories (small (<100 beds) and large (the omitted group)).  We classify hospitals 
as teaching hospitals if they report at least twenty full-time residents. We also represent 
whether the hospital is a member of a multi-hospital system with an indicator reflecting 
system membership (see Madison (2001) for details on the construction of our system 
variable).  Data on hospital characteristics are matched to individual patients based on the 
hospital to which the patient was initially admitted.  Our third data source is The 
Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, from which we obtained comprehensive information on 
the characteristics of HRRs in 1995-1996, including population; the number of Medicare 
enrollees; the number of acute care beds per 1,000 residents; hospital employees per 
1,000 residents; number of registered nurses, total, primary care, and specialist physicians 
per 1,000 residents; and price-adjusted Medicare reimbursements per enrollee for all non-
capitated, inpatient hospital, professional and laboratory, outpatient, and home health 
services. 
  We estimate equations (1) and (1a) using OLS on two samples of individuals.  We 
report heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering at the HRR 
level.  First, we estimate the equations using as a control group only patients from a 
matched set of control HRRs that are similar to our entry HRRs in terms of their 
observable characteristics.  To construct this set of control HRRs, we estimate a probit 
model that had as its unit of observation an HRR.  The dependent variable equals one if   17
the HRR was one of the five HRRs in our study that experienced entry by a cardiac 
specialty hospital in 1997 or 1998 and zero otherwise.  The independent variables are 
from The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.
10  With the parameter estimates from this 
model, we calculate a predicted probability of specialty hospital entry for each HRR, and 
include in the set of matched control HRRs every HRR with a predicted probability of 
entry that is within 15 percentage points (either above or below) of the entry HRRs' 
predicted probabilities. This yields a total of 20 control HRRs.   
Second, we estimate the equations using a broader control group consisting of all 
HRRs in which no specialty hospital entered.  In both samples, we weight patients 
hospitalized in 1996 twice as much as those hospitalized in 1999, because our sample 
only includes patients hospitalized from July 1-December 31, 1996, but includes patients 
hospitalized from January 1-December 31, 1999.
11  We weight patients hospitalized in 
1993 five times as much as those hospitalized in 1999, because our 1993 sample is a 20% 
random sample of Medicare beneficiaries from the full calendar year. 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for patients from entry HRRs, patients from 
matched HRRs without specialty hospital entry (matched control HRRs), and patients 
from all HRRs without specialty hospital entry (all control HRRs).  The first row of Table 
1 shows some important differences between entry and control HRRs.  First, entry HRRs 
start the entry period in 1996 with a higher level of one-year hospital expenditures than 
control HRRs ($20,603 versus $18,783 to $19,734, depending on control group).  
Second, entry HRRs have faster pre-entry hospital expenditure growth (i.e., during 1993-
                                                 
10 The results of this probit are in Appendix Table 1. 
11 Because 100% sample Medicare claims are not available before 1996, we could not obtain an 
expenditure history for patients admitted in the first months of that year.  We limited the cohort to patients 
hospitalized on July 1, 1996 or later in order to obtain 180 days of expenditure history.   18
96) than do control HRRs over the same period (17.4 percent versus 15.3 or 15.4 percent, 
depending on control group).  Third, entry HRRs have slower post-entry expenditure 
growth (i.e., during 1996-99) than do control HRRs over the same period (-4.9 percent 
versus -0.2 or -1.7 percent, depending on control group).  
In addition, entry HRRs have a slightly greater proportion of discretionary cardiac 
admissions than other HRRs, both prior to entry and throughout the study period.   Under 
the assumption that AMI is the only illness we analyze for which admission is entirely 
nondiscretionary, entry HRRs had approximately one percentage point fewer 
nondiscretionary admissions than control HRRs.  In entry HRRs in 1993, 11.8 percent of 
patients were admitted with a diagnosis of AMI; in all control HRRs, the comparable 
figure is 12.7 percent.
12  Finally, entry HRRs have slightly lower pre-entry mortality than 
control HRRs.  In 1993, one-year mortality for entry HRRs was 22.1 percent; by 
comparison, one-year mortality in all control HRRs was 23.2 percent. Otherwise, there is 
little systematic evidence of differences between entry and control HRRs.    
 
V. RESULTS 
  Table 2 presents estimates of β from equations (1) and (1a), the effect of specialty 
hospital entry on treatments and health outcomes for all patients in entry HRRs.  Each 
number in the table represents a separate regression coefficient from a model with a 
different dependent variable, specification, or control group.  The first three columns 
present estimates from equation (1) and (1a) using the matched control sample; the 
second three columns present estimates using the all control sample.  The first and fourth 
                                                 
12 Classifying only IHD admissions as discretionary does not change this conclusion.  Entry HRRs had 1.77 
times as many IHD as AMI admissions in 1993 (=0.2050 / 0.1160); by comparison, all control HRRs had  
1.63 (=0.2036 / 0.1251) times as many.     19
columns present estimates from equation (1) using 1996 as the base year; the second and 
fifth columns present estimates from equation (1) using 1993 as the base year; and the 
third and sixth columns present estimates from equation (1a) using all three years.  
  The first row confirms the basic finding from Table 1: patients from entry HRRs 
experienced statistically significantly slower growth in their hospital expenditures than 
patients from control HRRs during the 1996-99 period.  Based on the models in Columns 
1 and 4, hospital expenditures for patients from entry HRRs grew by $524 to $763 less 
(depending on specification) than did patients from control HRRs.  Relative to a base of 
$18,750 (1999 all-control average expenditures), this amounts to 2.8 to 4.1 percent 
slower growth.
13   
  Differences in health outcomes in entry versus control HRRs are generally small 
and statistically insignificant.
14  Differences in rates of mortality and readmission with 
AMI are 0.2 percentage points or less and statistically insignificant.  There is evidence of 
a statistically greater rate of readmission for heart failure of approximately 0.3 percentage 
points.  However, because admission for heart failure is at least partially discretionary, 
this may represent a combination of differences in outcomes and differences in treatment 
patterns conditional on outcome.  In any event, specialty hospital entry improves 
efficiency as long as the value of a year without readmission for cardiac complications is 
less than $218,000 ($218,000  =  $763 expenditure reduction from entry / 0.0035 CHF 
readmission increase).   
                                                 
13 Full results from these regression equations are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
14 Estimating these models as a probit rather than a linear probability model does not change this result.  
For example, the estimated marginal effect of specialty hospital entry on mortality at the sample average 
was 0.0979 (standard error 0.3012).   20
  Over a longer time period, however, estimates of the consequences of specialty 
hospitals crucially depend on assumptions about what would have happened in entry 
HRRs in the absence of specialty hospital entry.  Columns 2 and 4 use a base year of 
1993 and assume that the levels of expenditures and outcomes in 1993 would have 
remained the same in entry HRRs in the absence of entry.  Columns 3 and 6 use a base 
year of 1993 but assume that 1993-96 trends in expenditures and outcomes would have 
remained the same.   
  Under the assumption that entry HRRs would have remained at their 1993 levels, 
specialty hospital entry does not significantly affect cost, but reduces quality of care.  
Patients in entry versus control HRRs have 1.1 to 1.3 percentage points greater one-year 
mortality post-entry than they do pre-entry, without consistent offsetting decreases in 
readmission for AMI or CHF.  On a base of 22.5 percent 1996 all-control mortality 
(Table 1), this amounts to a 4.9 to 5.8 percent increase.  However, because 1996 is the 
most recent year immediately before the entry events in our sample, we believe that 1996 
is the most appropriate base year, at least for models that assume that entry HRRs would 
have retained their levels in the absence of entry.   
  In contrast, under the assumption that entry HRRs would have retained their 
1993-96 trend in expenditures and outcomes in the absence of entry, specialty hospital 
entry leads to both a reduction in expenditures and a decrease in mortality.  According to 
Columns 3 and 6, entry reduces expenditures by $1,277 to $1,653 (depending on 
specification), or 6.8 to 8.8 percent (1,277 / 18,750 to 1,653 / 18,750) and mortality by 
0.9 to 1.1 percentage points, or 4.0 to 4.9 percent (0.9 / 22.5 to 1.1 / 22.5).  This reduction   21
in mortality is generally accompanied by an increase in readmission with complications, 
however, indicating that the additional survivors have worse overall cardiac health.   
  The estimated expenditure consequences of specialty hospital entry are not driven 
by any obviously spurious factors.  They are not driven by any particular HRR.  
Unpublished estimates of the effect of specialty hospital entry by HRR show that entry 
has a statistically significant negative expenditure effect in four of the five entry HRRs 
(the positive effect in the fifth HRR is small and statistically insignificant).  Differential 
changes in Medicare reimbursement rates also do not explain observed expenditure 
effects.  The most important geographic determinant of Medicare payments to acute-care 
PPS hospitals is the Medicare wage index (see Hackbarth (2002) for discussion), which is 
constructed so that its average value nationwide is always one.  The average Medicare 
wage index for entry HRRs was 1.016 in 1993, 1.011 in 1996 and 1.005 in 1999 
(unpublished calculation based on Medicare wage indices by MSA weighted by the 
number of admissions from the MSA's analogous HRR in 1996).   
  Differences in trends in reported diagnosis mix and intensive procedure use also 
account for virtually none of the gap in expenditures between entry and control HRRs.  
Omitting controls for diagnosis mix from the regression models underlying Table 2 
results in an estimated expenditure effect of entry of -$530 (with a standard error of 309) 
for the matched-control sample.  Including controls for procedure use (365-day CATH, 
PTCA, and CABG indicator variables) in the regression models underlying Table 2 
results in an estimated entry effect of -$514 (with a standard error of 164) for this sample.   
  To investigate whether differential admissions practices account for the estimated 
differences in expenditures, we estimated β from equations (1) and (1a) on a sample of   22
AMI patients only; these estimates appear in Table 3.  In particular, because admissions 
for AMI are generally mandatory, any apparently cost-saving effect of specialty hospitals 
in Table 2 that was due to discretionary admission of healthier patients in entry HRRs 
would not appear in Table 3. According to Table 3, the estimated expenditure effects of 
entry among AMI patients are similar in magnitude to (although less precise than) the 
effects in the population of cardiac patients as a whole.  Along these lines, the estimated 
outcome effects of entry among AMI patients are not statistically distinguishable from 
the effects in the population of cardiac patients as a whole.   
Table 4 presents additional descriptive statistics and estimates of the effect of 
admission to a specialty hospital in 1999 on expenditures, intensive procedure use, and 
health outcomes.  The results in this table are based only on patients from the eight HRRs 
with an open specialty hospital as of January 1, 1999.  The first two columns of the table 
present the average values of treatment intensity, health outcomes, and patient 
characteristics for patients admitted to specialty and general medical hospitals, 
respectively.  The third column presents the raw difference between the specialty and 
general hospital populations, and the fourth contains regression estimates of β from 
equation (2). 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that specialty hospitals account for a 
small but significant share of admissions (5.7 percent=4,520/(75,000+4,520)) in HRRs 
where they operate.  In addition, consistent with the findings in Table 1, HRRs with a 
specialty hospital open in 1999 have higher average 1-year cardiac expenditures than 
other HRRs.  This figure—$20,124 (=20,578*.06 + 20,095*.94)—is even higher than the 
average for the five entry HRRs ($19,595 [Table 1, Column 3]).      23
There are substantial differences in the characteristics and outcomes of patients 
admitted to the two types of hospitals.  Patients admitted to a specialty hospital are much 
more likely to receive an intensive cardiac procedure.  They also have substantially better 
health outcomes.  They are much less likely to die within one year (14 percent versus 
23.9 percent), and have lower rates of cardiac complications.  However, patients initially 
admitted to specialty versus general hospitals also have very different characteristics on 
admission.  They are younger (by 2.5 years), are much less likely to be female or black, 
have much lower 180-day prior expenditures ($1,244 versus $2,077), and are much more 
likely to be admitted with a diagnosis of IHD (40.3 percent versus 18.3 percent), one of 
the less-severe illnesses in our sample in terms of expected hospital expenditures.  To 
investigate whether these differences in characteristics could be explained by differences 
in the diagnosis mix and the types of treatments provided at specialty hospitals, we ran 
regressions of age, gender, race, and 180-day prior expenditures on an indicator variable 
for specialty hospital admission and a set of 71 DRG indicator variables (DRGs are a 
function of diagnosis, severity, and type of treatment, and form the basis for a patient's 
Medicare reimbursement).  These unpublished results show that even controlling for 
DRGs, patients admitted to specialty hospitals were significantly younger, healthier, and 
more likely to be white and male.  
On net, these effects lead patients admitted to a specialty hospital to have raw 1-
year hospital expenditures that are $483 higher than those for patients at general 
hospitals.  Controlling for observable hospital and patient characteristics does not reduce 
the estimated magnitude of this effect; β is estimated to be $610, though it is not 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance.  Controlling for   24
observable characteristics does reduce differences in procedure rates and health outcomes 




What are the effects of specialty hospitals on the costs and quality of care of 
Medicare beneficiaries?  Advocates of these hospitals contend that their focused mission 
improves quality and lowers costs.  Critics contend that these (predominantly for-profit) 
hospitals concentrate on providing profitable procedures and attracting relatively healthy 
patients--leaving (predominantly nonprofit) general hospitals with a less-remunerative, 
sicker patient population. 
We find evidence in support of both of these hypotheses.  Between 1996 and 
1999, patients in HRRs with specialty-hospital entry experienced lower growth in 
expenditures than patients in control HRRs.  This finding is robust to different 
specifications of the control group, and for AMI as well as other cardiac illnesses.  The 
expenditure savings from entry is not driven by any particular HRR, by differential trends 
in Medicare reimbursement rates, or by changes in procedure or diagnosis mix.  There is 
only weak evidence of differences in trends in health outcomes in entry versus control 
HRRs.   
  Over a longer period, estimates of the efficiency benefits of specialty hospital 
entry are more dependent on assumptions about what would have happened in entry 
HRRs in the absence of entry.  Under the assumption that entry HRRs would have 
remained at the same level of expenditures and outcomes as in 1993, entry reduces   25
efficiency:  entry does not affect cost, but leads to an increase in mortality.  Under the 
assumption that entry HRRs would have retained their 1993-96 trend in expenditures and 
outcomes in the absence of entry, entry improves efficiency:  entry leads to both a 
reduction in expenditures and a decrease in mortality.   
Balancing this, there is evidence that specialty hospitals choose to enter markets 
with healthier patients, to provide additional intensive treatments of questionable cost-
effectiveness, and to treat healthier patients within markets -- behaviors that, under 
reasonable assumptions, may reduce social welfare.  Specialty hospitals enter markets 
that have slightly lower pre-entry levels of mortality.  In HRRs with a specialty hospital, 
those who attend specialty hospitals are much more likely to receive a profitable 
intensive cardiac procedure in the year after their onset of illness than those who do not, 
even controlling for demographic characteristics, diagnosis, and Medicare claims history.  
In addition, specialty hospitals have patient populations that are younger, more likely to 
be non-black and male, and healthier than their counterparts at general hospitals -- 
characteristics that may be positively correlated with profitability.  However, because we 
do not observe all of the determinants of costs, treatments, and health outcomes, we can 
not definitively apportion the observed cross-sectional effect of specialty hospital 
admission into socially-constructive versus socially-harmful effects.   
These seemingly-conflicting findings are consistent with other research by one of 
us presenting a similarly mixed view of for-profit hospitals.  For-profits increase market-
wide efficiency by improving the performance of competing nonprofits (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2002) even though they themselves provide additional treatment that has only 
marginal medical benefit (Becker, Kessler, and McClellan, 2005).  Our study reaches a   26
similar conclusion.  Because the share of specialty hospitals in markets with a specialty 
hospital is only six percent, market-wide increases in efficiency from specialty hospital 
entry must come from entry-induced increases in efficiency at general hospitals, even 
though specialty hospitals engage in behavior that has the potential to reduce social 
welfare.   
Identifying the mechanism through which specialty hospitals improve general 
hospital performance is an important topic for future research.  Future research might also 
focus on ways to alter the incentives provided by the Medicare reimbursement system to 
maximize the efficiency benefits from specialty hospitals while minimizing their costs.  
In addition, further analysis could investigate whether the entry of specialty hospitals 
impacts the provision of less-remunerative, non-cardiac services by general hospitals.  
Understanding the impact of specialty hospitals on other aspects of hospitals' decision-
making will allow for a broader assessment of the implications of specialty hospitals for 
social welfare.     27
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1993 1996 1999 % change % change 1993 1996 1999 % change % change 1993 1996 1999 % change % change
1993-96 1996-99 1993-96 1996-99 1993-96 1996-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Measures of treatment intensity
1-year hospital expenditures 17,549 20,603 19,595 17.4% -4.9% 16,292 18,783 18,750 15.3% -0.2% 17,101 19,734 19,406 15.4% -1.7%
1-day CATH 0.0781 0.1048 0.1207 2.7% 1.6% 0.0738 0.1000 0.1205 2.6% 2.1% 0.0631 0.0901 0.1063 2.7% 1.6%
365-day CATH 0.2116 0.2412 0.2533 3.0% 1.2% 0.2157 0.2428 0.2601 2.7% 1.7% 0.2097 0.2369 0.2522 2.7% 1.5%
1-day PTCA 0.0190 0.0359 0.0524 1.7% 1.7% 0.0253 0.0419 0.0592 1.7% 1.7% 0.0242 0.0417 0.0548 1.8% 1.3%
365-day PTCA 0.0596 0.0826 0.1036 2.3% 2.1% 0.0692 0.0912 0.1116 2.2% 2.0% 0.0679 0.0917 0.1094 2.4% 1.8%
1-day CABG 0.0138 0.0256 0.0256 1.2% 0.0% 0.0193 0.0289 0.0303 1.0% 0.1% 0.0175 0.0262 0.0267 0.9% 0.1%
365-day CABG 0.0708 0.0867 0.0792 1.6% -0.7% 0.0780 0.0902 0.0856 1.2% -0.5% 0.0725 0.0823 0.0776 1.0% -0.5%
Measures of health outcomes
365-day mortality 0.2205 0.2341 0.2348 1.4% 0.1% 0.2318 0.2311 0.2295 -0.1% -0.2% 0.2326 0.2335 0.2350 0.1% 0.1%
365-day CHF readmission 0.0974 0.0945 0.0966 -0.3% 0.2% 0.0895 0.0888 0.0886 -0.1% 0.0% 0.0970 0.0995 0.1013 0.3% 0.2%
365-day AMI readmission 0.0238 0.0229 0.0242 -0.1% 0.1% 0.0249 0.0252 0.0271 0.0% 0.2% 0.0260 0.0264 0.0288 0.0% 0.2%
Patient characteristics
Age 77.29 77.79 78.35 0.6% 0.7% 77.09 77.48 77.95 0.5% 0.6% 77.21 77.77 78.29 0.7% 0.7%
Percent female 0.5532 0.5573 0.5618 0.4% 0.4% 0.5431 0.5459 0.5473 0.3% 0.1% 0.5520 0.5636 0.5631 1.2% 0.0%
Percent black 0.1126 0.1055 0.1026 -0.7% -0.3% 0.0798 0.0780 0.0790 -0.2% 0.1% 0.0852 0.0888 0.0898 0.4% 0.1%
180-day prior hospital expenditure 1,665 1,931 2,006 16.0% 3.9% 1,439 1,651 1,752 14.7% 6.1% 1,634 1,927 1,992 17.9% 3.4%
Diagnosis of AMI 0.1175 0.1094 0.1076 -0.8% -0.2% 0.1265 0.1219 0.1238 -0.5% 0.2% 0.1215 0.1191 0.1188 -0.2% 0.0%
Diagnosis of IHD 0.2054 0.2019 0.1944 -0.4% -0.8% 0.2050 0.2047 0.1986 0.0% -0.6% 0.2048 0.2054 0.1941 0.1% -1.1%
Diagnosis of dysrythmia 0.1238 0.1230 0.1383 -0.1% 1.5% 0.1138 0.1154 0.1260 0.2% 1.1% 0.1103 0.1133 0.1251 0.3% 1.2%
Diagnosis of heart failure 0.1951 0.1826 0.1834 -1.3% 0.1% 0.1939 0.1758 0.1810 -1.8% 0.5% 0.2078 0.1854 0.1934 -2.2% 0.8%
Diagnosis of other heart condition 0.0654 0.0718 0.0780 0.6% 0.6% 0.0709 0.0728 0.0767 0.2% 0.4% 0.0679 0.0719 0.0787 0.4% 0.7%
Diagnosis of circulatory sys cond 0.0594 0.0611 0.0623 0.2% 0.1% 0.0565 0.0614 0.0604 0.5% -0.1% 0.0564 0.0585 0.0569 0.2% -0.2%
Diagnosis of cerebrovascular 0.2335 0.2502 0.2360 1.7% -1.4% 0.2334 0.2481 0.2335 1.5% -1.5% 0.2312 0.2465 0.2330 1.5% -1.4%
Number of observations 11,843 28,170 55,109 311,453 816,390 1,697,166 29,369 73,812 145,964
All US Without Specialty Hospital Entry HRRs with Specialty Hospital Entry Matched HRRs Without Specialty Hospital Entry
 Table 2:  Estimated Effect of Specialty Hospital Entry on Expenditures, Treatments, and Outcomes, Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries 












93, 96, and 99 
data w/control 
for linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measures of treatment intensity
1-year hospital expenditures -524 * 194 -1,277 ** -763 *** 101 -1,653 ***
(306) (468) (510) (246) (453) (405)
1-day CATH -0.2122 -0.0364 -0.3131 -0.4447 -0.1344 -0.7531 *
(0.3307) (0.5739) (0.6518) (0.2791) (0.4597) (0.4233)
365-day CATH -0.4659 0.0331 -0.8819 -0.3090 0.3975 -0.9599 *
(0.4439) (0.7182) (0.7894) (0.3572) (0.6030) (0.5395)
1-day PTCA 0.2569 0.2879 0.2739 -0.0393 0.0870 -0.1692
(0.2445) (0.5125) (0.4561) (0.1679) (0.4809) (0.2875)
365-day PTCA 0.2622 0.3267 0.2784 0.1897 0.4872 -0.0663
(0.4307) (0.4980) (0.7925) (0.1653) (0.4094) (0.5111)
1-day CABG -0.1038 0.2097 -0.3942 -0.1480 * 0.0902 -0.3968 **
(0.1529) (0.2529) (0.2592) (0.0871) (0.0851) (0.1879)
365-day CABG -0.3963 0.3016 -0.9989 ** -0.2299 0.2944 -0.7233 ***
(0.2589) (0.5723) (0.4493) (0.1475) (0.2789) (0.2156)
Measures of health outcomes
365-day mortality -0.0111 1.1154 ** -1.1425 ** 0.1721 1.2652 *** -0.8912 ***
(0.2413) (0.4331) (0.5227) (0.1398) (0.3435) (0.1807)
365-day CHF readmission 0.1862 -0.4885 ** 0.8361 ** 0.3471 *** 0.0580 0.6337 ***
(0.1662) (0.2234) (0.3301) (0.0879) (0.1998) (0.2273)
365-day AMI readmission -0.0846 -0.2116 0.0118 -0.0352 -0.1403 0.0817
(0.1642) (0.2229) (0.2218) (0.1321) (0.1845) (0.1717)
Number of observations 303,055 242,285 344,267 2,596,835 2,075,571 2,920,131
Matched Control HRRs All Control HRRs
 
 
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients from models with discrete dependent variables multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation.   Table 3:  Estimated Effect of Specialty Hospital Entry on Expenditures, Treatments, and Outcomes, Elderly Medicare 












93, 96, and 99 
data w/control 
for linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measures of treatment intensity
1-year hospital expenditures -499 -352 -654 -1,011 ** -312 -1,740 **
(597) (453) (1002) (425) (334) (778)
1-day CATH -0.9145 -0.2517 -1.1682 -0.3883 -0.4041 -0.3578
(0.7347) (1.5993) (1.8619) (0.4796) (0.9237) (0.9898)
365-day CATH -0.0444 -2.1522 2.2761 0.4004 -1.9614 3.0149 **
(0.9392) (1.8258) (1.8750) (0.7723) (1.5364) (1.5316)
1-day PTCA -0.7978 0.5121 -1.9482 -0.8299 * 0.3754 -1.9377
(0.6782) (1.4482) (1.7771) (0.4439) (1.2249) (1.2723)
365-day PTCA 0.0641 0.6300 -0.5847 0.3485 1.2341 -0.6108
(1.2163) (1.6317) (2.0259) (0.4694) (1.2996) (0.6049)
1-day CABG -0.4943 -0.0329 -0.8939 -0.5487 -0.1755 -0.9364
(0.4761) (0.3810) (0.8564) (0.4258) (0.2306) (0.7884)
365-day CABG -1.2821 -1.8013 -0.5246 -0.6091 -1.6780 0.5337
(1.2976) (1.5610) (1.5227) (1.1101) (1.1543) (1.2173)
Measures of health outcomes
365-day mortality -1.1014 0.3320 -2.7772 -0.5590 1.2489 -2.3911 *
(1.1136) (1.9069) (2.0229) (0.6589) (1.6560) (1.3624)
365-day CHF readmission 1.7659 *** -0.3871 4.1933 *** 1.0035 *** 0.1943 2.0285 **
(0.5150) (0.6142) (1.1466) (0.3541) (0.4223) (0.9172)
365-day AMI readmission 1.1393 * -0.6965 2.8770 *** 0.7667 -0.6149 2.2103 ***
(0.6790) (0.8443) (0.9254) (0.5779) (0.6491) (0.8157)
Number of observations 35,143 28,230 40,104 318,669 256,839 359,453
Matched Control HRRs All Control HRRs
 
 
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficients from models with discrete dependent variables multiplied by 100 for 
ease of interpretation.   
 Table 4: Unadjusted and Regression-Adjusted Differences in Expenditures, 
Treatments, and Outcomes for Patients Admitted to Specialty and General 
Hospitals, Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries with Cardiac Illness Who Live in an HRR 














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measures of treatment intensity
1-year hospital expenditures 20,578 20,095 483 610
(627)
1-day CATH 0.3201 0.1009 0.2192 0.0996 ***
(0.0283)
365-day CATH 0.4681 0.2390 0.2291 0.0733 ***
(0.0279)
1-day PTCA 0.1564 0.0417 0.1147 0.0636 **
(0.0254)
365-day PTCA 0.2206 0.0938 0.1268 0.0549 ***
(0.0207)
1-day CABG 0.1027 0.0201 0.0826 0.0574 ***
(0.0160)
365-day CABG 0.2064 0.0704 0.1360 0.0784 ***
(0.0236)
Measures of health outcomes
365-day mortality 0.1403 0.2387 -0.0984 -0.0337 **
(0.0138)
365-day CHF readmission 0.0772 0.0993 -0.0221 -0.0020
(0.0060)
365-day AMI readmission 0.0206 0.0260 -0.0054 -0.0031
(0.0025)
Patient characteristics
Age 76.04 78.53 -2.49
Percent female 0.4591 0.5632 -0.1041
Percent black 0.0303 0.0916 -0.0613
180-day prior hospital expenditure 1244 2077 -833
Diagnosis of AMI 0.0823 0.1104 -0.0281
Diagnosis of IHD 0.4033 0.1830 0.2203
Diagnosis of dysrythmia 0.1232 0.1387 -0.0155
Diagnosis of heart failure 0.0973 0.1896 -0.0923
Diagnosis of other heart condition 0.0918 0.0818 0.0100
Diagnosis of circulatory sys cond 0.0896 0.0578 0.0318
Diagnosis of cerebrovascular 0.1124 0.2388 -0.1264
Number of observations 4,520 75,000  
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficients from models with 
discrete dependent variables multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Appendix Table 1:  Probit Estimates of the Effect of HRR Characteristics on the 
Probability of Specialty Hospital Entry 
 
Parameter Standard Error
Medicare enrollees ('000) 0.0051 0.0038
Population ('000,000) -0.0836 0.3270
Acute care beds/1000 residents -0.4055 0.7455
Hospital employees/1000 residents 0.4016 0.2753
RNs/1000 residents -0.8506 1.0313
Medicare total noncapitated payment/enrollee 0.0057 0.0025
Medicare inpatient hospital payment/enrollee -0.0062 0.0030
Medicare professional/lab payment/enrollee -0.0059 0.0031
Medicare outpatient payment/enrollee -0.0138 0.0070
Medicare home health payment/enrollee -0.0060 0.0031
MDs/1000 residents 0.3782 1.3379
Primary care MDs/1000 residents -0.3517 1.3352
Specialist MDs/1000 residents -0.3877 1.3398
Number of observations 306
   35
Appendix Table 2:  Regression Estimates of the Effect of Specialty Hospital Entry, 
Patient Characteristics, and Hospital Characteristics on Expenditures 
Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Coefficient estimate
Entry HRR -524 306 -763 246
age 65-69 3172 193 3386 79
age 70-74 3436 219 3637 73
age 75-79 3358 270 3544 65
age 80-84 2621 169 2744 52
age 85-89 1482 141 1622 47
female -878 102 -927 41
black 1813 265 1180 110
diagnosis of AMI 4006 429 3910 118
diagnosis of IHD 1751 292 2231 95
diagnosis of dysrythmia -2845 181 -2679 66
diagnosis of heart failure 823 307 675 87
diagnosis of other heart cond 2149 321 2589 135
diagnosis of circulatory disorder 6297 419 6359 115
for-profit hospital 1007 337 719 149
nonprofit hospital -291 316 -138 106
system hospital 601 205 328 86
large hospital 1392 268 1285 89
teaching hospital 1781 424 2303 154
year=1999 -243 187 48 63
180day prior hospital expenditure 206 13 189 4
('000)
Number of observations 303,055
Matched Control HRRs All Control HRRs
 